The aim of this work is to identify the determinants of health spending differentials among Italian regions, which could highlight the existence of potential margins for savings. The analysis exploits a dataset for the panel of the 21 Italian regions starting in the early 1990s and ending in 2006. After having controlled for standard healthcare demand indicators, spending differentials appear to be associated with differences in the degree of appropriateness of the treatments, supply structure and social capital indicators. These results suggest that savings could be achieved without reducing the amount of services supplied to citizens. This is particularly important in view of the expected rise in health spending associated with the forecast demographic developments.
Introduction
* Health spending represents a significant share of public and private budgets in Italy as in the majority of developed countries. Public health expenditure accounts for about 7 per cent of GDP and over the last decades it has been growing significantly faster than income. Given the expected population ageing, it is likely that spending will continue to increase in the future as well, raising a serious challenge to fiscal policy and the sustainability of public finances. According to recent projections published by the Economic Policy Committee (2009) and the OECD (2006), health spending is in fact the budget item with the highest expected growth rate among the age-related expenditures, not only in Italy but in other developed economies as well.
Despite several measures aimed at improving the organisation of the system and the incentives provided by the financing mechanism, the Italian national health system (Sistema Sanitario Nazionale or SSN) has historically displayed not only a sustained growth in outlays, but also large deficits. Expenditure restraint has been achieved only occasionally, mainly through measures with temporary effects on cash payments. 1 The provision of healthcare in Italy is the responsibility of the regional governments, within guidelines set at the central level to ensure that all citizens access similar amounts and quality of healthcare (see Piperno and Di Orio, 1990; Giannoni and Hitiris, 2002) . Notwithstanding a significant redistribution of resources, there remain spending differentials between regions. These could be due to structural differences (such as demographic or epidemiological characteristics) or they could reflect differences in the quality of the services provided to patients and in the degree of efficiency in the use of public resources. In the latter case, spending differentials could highlight potential scope to improve the value for money in healthcare (i.e. reducing healthcare outlays and/or increasing the coverage and the quality of the service).
The objective of this work is to examine whether saving margins exist by identifying the main drivers of regional spending differentials that are not due to structural differences in population or other determinants of healthcare demand. Other works have explored spending differentials in * Banca d'Italia, Structural Economic Analysis Department -Economics, Research and International Relations Area E-mail: maura.francese@bancaditalia.it; marzia.romanelli@bancaditalia.it. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. We thank for their comments two anonymous referees, the colleagues at the Public Finance Division of the Bank of Italy, the discussant and the participants at conferences and seminars where previous versions of this work were presented. The usual disclaimers apply.6 order to ascertain whether they reflect differences in the quality and/or access to care (for the US see Skinner et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2009) , either focusing on certain types of services (for example hospital care as in Yasaitis et al., 2009) or on spending for particular public programmes and categories of treatments (for example Fisher et. al., 2003a , consider end-of-life spending for Medicare beneficiaries in the US). These works suggest that higher spending does not systematically reflect better quality or access, but that it is mainly linked to care practices (such as a greater orientation towards inpatient or specialist care) or to targeting specific care practices to the appropriate reference population (see for example Bodenheimer and Berry-Millet, 2009 ).
Furthermore, higher spending does not appear to be systematically related to improved health outcomes or care satisfaction (Fisher et al., 2003b; Fowler et al., 2008) .
In this work we follow a more aggregate approach, considering per capita health expenditure in the Italian regions 2 and studying the drivers of unexplained differentials. In doing so we start with an approach similar to that used in the literature to compare health spending across countries. 3 In this respect our setting presents several advantages, given that it is reasonable to assume a similar structure of preferences, input prices and broad institutional arrangements throughout the country.
Italian regions have a common legal and institutional framework and, as explained above, are mandated to provide homogeneous healthcare coverage. 4 Importantly, regions share common financing mechanisms. Notwithstanding the many changes and reforms, it can be taken that the resources made available at the regional level are based on the overall need for healthcare in each region and past spending, 5 independently of the source of financing and regional fiscal capacity.
6
In practice, the central government has been responsible for filling the gap between the financial needs of each region and the actual funding derived from revenue directly collected by the regions (e.g. a regional tax on productive activities and a personal income surtax) and through an 7 equalising centralised procedure which uses general fiscal revenues. 7 Given that the financing mechanism and equalising procedure are common to all the regions, 8 their incentives/disincentives are likely to be the same, plausibly impacting on the overall level of spending but less on the regional differentials.
In order to set the background for the empirical analysis, we start by describing health expenditure dynamics and their regional distribution. The third section presents the model from which we derive our estimating equations, describes the analysis of per capita regional spending determinants, identifies the drivers of observed differentials and discusses the results. The final section draws some conclusions.
Health expenditure developments and regional differentials
Since the establishment of the SSN, total public spending on healthcare has increased significantly (from 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1979 to 7.3 per cent in 2010). 9 The considerable effort made to curb expenditure in the first part of the 1990s owing to the crisis experienced at that time and also in view of the need to meet the Maastricht criteria in order to qualify for admission in the Eurozone 10 was the only real exception: in the period 1991-95 the expenditure to GDP ratio fell by more than one percentage point. However, the nature of the decline was not structural and was achieved mainly through spending postponements and generalised cuts in cash outlays.
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Indeed, the positive results realised in the first half of the 1990s were more than offset by the large increase over the ensuing decade ( Figure 1 and Table 1 ).
The strong dynamics of health expenditure observed in Italy might reflect not only structural factors (such as the rising costs of new expensive technologies and population ageing) but also 7 In more recent years the effort to promote fiscal responsibility of the regions has been enhanced by the rules to discourage the formation of deficits in the health sector. The budget for 2005 and following years introduced automatic procedures for the appointment of special administrators and for increases in the regional income tax surcharge and tax on productive activities. 8 Different arrangements are in place between the ordinary statute regions and the special statute ones (Valle d'Aosta, Trentino, Bolzano, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna and Sicilia). However this affects mainly the composition of financing (share of own resources versus funds drawn from national general taxation). The principle of providing comprehensive and homogeneous coverage through a national health system applies to all parts of the country. 9 For the first fifteen years since the introduction of the SSN see also Franco (1993) . 10 As already noted, the existence of credible internal and external constraints during the first half of the 1990s might have contributed to expenditure containment (see Bordignon and Turati, 2009). 11 In 1992, the SSN was reformed for the first time with the aim, on the one hand, of increasing competition among providers (both public and private) and, on the other, of strenghtening the planning phase. However, several of the measures approved over the years 1992-94 were in fact meant to curb expenditure in the short term, for example introducing co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical and diagnostic services.
8 the lack of effective use of public resources. 12 Since in future Italian public finances will have to absorb the costs of the expected demographic developments 13 and those induced by the economic and financial crisis, it is of growing importance to identify room for manoeuvre and appropriate measures to increase efficiency in the use of the funds allocated to the healthcare sector. 1978-1986 17.9 3.7 1987-1995 8.1 2.7 1987-1991 14.8 8.6 1992-1995 0.2 -4.3 1996-2010 5.9 3.7 Source: Our computations based on RGSEP, various years. Real expenditure computed using CPI indices published by Istat.
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A descriptive analysis of the gap between expenditure levels among the different Italian regions and its determinants can be a useful starting point to detect possible inefficiencies and room for potential savings. The Italian regions share a common legal framework and the same basic principles (i.e. universal access and comprehensiveness) but operate in a context of administrative autonomy: each region can adopt, up to a certain extent, different organisational architectures (such as public/private mix, network of hospitals, etc.) and within limits vary the degree of financing through regional taxation and co-payments. A first glance at the per capita public current health expenditure highlights non-negligible variation among the Italian regions (see Figure 2a ). However, it is possible to identify at least one cluster formed by the regions of the South, which generally have 1) lower than average per capita expenditure, and 2) higher growth rates. This might suggest convergent dynamics among the different areas of the country.
Such findings seem to be confirmed by the estimate of the growth path of per capita health expenditure over the period 1996-2006 (see Figure 2b ). , where g i is the average growth rate of per capita health expenditure of region i in the period 1996 , Ex i 1996 is the value of per capita health expenditure in 1996, and ε i is a i.i.d. random variable with zero mean. In the estimate of m( ) we use the Nadaraya-Watson estimator with the optimal normal bandwidth (see Bowman and Azzalini, 1997 , for more details). This preliminary estimation ignores cross-region heterogeneity. Estimates are computed using R.
have higher levels of per capita health expenditure with respect to the national average, the South has higher growth rates.
However, this evidence is questioned when adjusting expenditure to take into account patients' mobility among regions and the different age structure of the population. In fact, spending in each region also reflects how many patients it attracts from other parts of the country 15 and how many elderly people need to be taken care of, given that a well-known stylised fact is the 'u' shape of the lifetime health costs profile where higher spending occurs when individuals are older. In particular, we observe that many southern patients travel to the Centre and North for medical care so that per capita spending for residents in the northern regions is higher than spending per treated person. This pattern is stable over time. Furthermore, as to the impact of the age structure, on average southern regions have a younger population. We therefore adjust per capita expenditure to take into account these two features. 16 In this case, per capita expenditure appears to be higher on average in the South. Moreover, variability increases across the country and data do not support the hypothesis of any convergence in the expenditure pattern (see Figure 3 ).
3. Regional differentials in health expenditure: are there saving margins?
The model
This section presents the model from which we derive the estimating equations. We consider a benevolent regional government (i) which wants to maximise the following:
(1) and health status characteristics that affect both the probability of being sick and the preference structure for the consumption of healthcare. We assume that the budget constraint is either not binding 17 or that the regional government can draw additional resources from the citizens resident in the region to finance the production of the optimal/desired health spending.
The optimal level of healthcare provision is then: Given the cost function C t (x), assumed to be the same in all regions, in each period t per capita public health expenditure will be:
where P i E is the equivalent population of region i, P ji is the population of region i in the age class j, a j is the coefficient relative to age class j, A is the total number of age classes (101), N is the number of regions (21). We have then adjusted expenditure to take into account population mobility and finally computed spending per capita values. We thank Demetrio Alampi for having suggested where to retrieve the information necessary to work out the equivalent population.
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where w i ('waste') 2) CG must be able to collect enough resources to finance the production of * i x in all the regions;
3) CG and the regions must observe spending levels and the composition of financing but not distinguish efficient technology from waste levels ) ( i w .
In a setting where the above conditions hold and where healthcare is financed both via transfers received from the central government and using revenue from local taxes, regions have the incentive to set the latter at the minimum if they believe that the CG will cover the remaining costs. In such a framework each region will be able to produce * i x and tax revenue collected by CG in rich regions will be used to finance spending in poor ones as well. Tax rates at local level will be correlated neither with efficiency in the production of healthcare nor with income differentials.
A similar framework, where the CG announces fixed flat transfers but only some regions believe in its commitment, will have an analogous outcome. Ex post, CG will find that to stick to its commitment is not optimal (otherwise in some regions it will not be possible to produce * i x ) and low local tax rates will not necessarily reflect high productive efficiency. They could also be due to regional beliefs (about the lack of credibility of CG commitment) or low demand levels. Again the ranking of regions according to the level of local tax rates will not necessarily reflect the 18 w i can be interpreted as the cost of inefficiency for region i.
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ranking in productive efficiency. In this set up regions that overspend with respect to the resources set by the central government are not necessarily the most inefficient ones.
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The empirical analysis in the following paragraph then moves forward to the estimation of equation (4) disregarding fiscal capacity, local taxation or regional deficit indicators. The aim being in the first step to infer differentials in spending among regions (w i ) which are not related to structural differences in the demand for healthcare (
) and in the second step to analyse the possible drivers of such gaps.
The empirical analysis -first step: the impact of demand factors
The first step considers regional per capita spending levels and their determinants in order to control for the forces that lie behind the observed dynamics of outlays embedded in the demand structure (such as demography, education, etc.) which can be assumed, at least in the short and medium term, to be independent of healthcare policies.
The empirical analysis at the international level has pinpointed the correlations between health spending levels and demand factors such as income, the demographic structure and the health status of the population (Newhouse, 1977; Gerdtham et al., 1998; Gerdtham and Jonsson, 2000) .
Usually, most of the empirical literature also controls for labour market and education indicators or variables capturing institutional differences between healthcare systems. Table 2 ).
20
In particular, we estimate the following semilog expenditure model:
where rexp_pc it is the real per capita expenditure observed in region i at time t, g(i) are the region specific effects that we initially assume to be composed of fixed effects, 26 i.e. g(i) =α i , and x includes: real per capita GDP; the dependency ratios of the elderly and children, to capture the Ushape of the age-expenditure profile; female life expectancy and a proxy for the health status of the population (this proxy takes into account the incidence series for the following conditions:
high blood pressure, heart attack, angina, other heart diseases, diabetes, ictus, together with male and female prevalence rates for malignant cancer); a proxy 27 for habits that affect health (such as tobacco and alcohol); 28 the female employment rate, as an indicator for the provision of informal care; the level of education (percentage of people with at least a bachelor degree); proxies for the regions' development measured as the percentage of employees respectively in agriculture and in manufacturing.
We also consider a time specific effect in order to separate the years before and after 1995. 29 As said above, the first half of the 1990s was a period of exceptional expenditure containment, achieved mainly through spending postponements and generalised cuts at the national level in 21 Expenditure data are derived from Ministero dell'Economia e delle finanze (various years). 22 Regional GDP is published by Istat (2007 and . 23 Health status indicators are drawn form the databases published by Istat (2009) . 24 Data on labour market participation, employment rates and education levels of the population (broken down by region and sex) have been computed using individual data provided by Istat (see Istat, Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro). We thank Federico Giorgi for having provided such computations. 25 The specification used reflects the nature of the regressors. All of them, apart from per capita GDP are ratios or dummies. 26 An alternative estimation strategy would be to implement a multilevel model which simultaneously considers both the first and the second step. Even though this procedure could be more efficient, it has two main drawbacks: 1) it requires stronger distributional assumptions on the error terms; 2) it would make it less straightforward to work out an estimate of the inefficiency levels and decompose and analyse them as reported in the following paragraph. We have estimated such a model as a robustenss check, however; estimated coefficients of the variables from the first and the second step and their significance are in line with those obtained following a two-step procedure. 27 Both the proxies for the health status and 'bad' habits are obtained via a principal component analysis (see Table 3 ), which allows us to reduce the dimension of the set of regressors and exploit the correlation among the variables. 28 In particular, the following are taken into account: the share of smokers (variable 'smoke'), the share of the population drinking at least half a litre of wine a day (variable 'wine') and the share of those who drink alcohol at least twice a week (variable 'alcohol'). 29 In particular, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years after 1995.
15 view of the need to contain government deficits and favour adjustment to meet the Maastricht parameters. Finally, ε it is the error term.
In particular, we consider three specifications (Table 4) , which simply differ as to the denominator used to compute the dependent variable (population, equivalent population for the consumption of hospital services or equivalent population for the consumption of pharmaceuticals -see footnote 16 -in the latter cases the variables accounting for the demographic structure of the population are not included among the regressors). We estimate (5) using a panel fixed effect estimator. (Gerdtham et al., 1998; Gerdtham and Jönsson, 2000) . Per capita expenditure is positively correlated with income (even though the variable is not always significant) as well as with life expectancy. As for labour market indicators, we consider female employment rates, since the more women are employed in the labour market the more often formal care substitutes informal care that is provided within the household (and thus the higher is the demand for formal healthcare). However, the employment rate turns out to be not statistically significant. (1) using weights for hospital services; (2) using weights for pharmaceutical consumption *, **, *** significance at respectively 10, 5 and 1 per cent level (Model 3a) Real total expenditure (corrected to take into account patient mobility and adjusted for equivalent population (2)) (Model 1a)
Real total expenditure (corrected to take into account patient mobility) (Model 2a) Real total expenditure (corrected to take into account patient mobility and adjusted for equivalent population (1)) The dependency ratios for children (0-4 years old) and for the elderly (75 years of age or older) allow us to capture the effect of the age structure of the population. The age profile of per capita expenditure highlights how the demand for healthcare is greater at very young ages and for older age cohorts (Jacobzone, 2002; EPC, 2006) . The results are partially unexpected: while the elderly dependency ratio has a positive and significant sign, the dependency ratio of the very young is not significant. This finding may be driven by considering too broad an age class (0-4 years of age) as the expenditure profile is higher at younger ages, particularly in infancy or early childhood (Cutler and Meara, 1997) .
The health status and bad habit indicators are both significant and have the expected sign ('poorer' health and 'worse' habits are associated with higher expenditure).
The dummy variable aimed at capturing the general cost containment effort exerted in the first part of the 1990s is highly significant and has the expected sign (the intercept of the expenditure curve is shifted downwards after 1995).
Regional fixed effects are shown in the lower panel of Table 4 . They are strongly consistent between the three specifications, with the correlations among the series ranging from 0.95 to 0.99.
First step: robustness checks
To check the robustness of our estimates we perform a series of exercises described in Appendix B. First, we re-estimate the three specifications discussed above using different indices for computing real values for per capita health expenditure and GDP. Secondly, we re-estimate the model using a stochastic frontier approach. We consider both time invariant and time varying specifications. All of the estimated models give very similar results; the correlation between the estimated regional effects series ranges between 0.95 and 1. The time varying models, in which unexplained expenditure is a function of time, indicate that, other things being equal, differentials in spending between regions are increasing over time, i.e. more efficient regions are also at an advantage to contain expenditure growth (not only levels).
Following a similar approach to Schmidt and Sickles (1984) , we approximate 'waste' (or unexplained differentials) for each region with the estimated fixed effects, that is i i w α = . In this way, however, any time invariant heterogeneity between the regions is also captured by the waste term.
31 Even though we acknowledge this identification issue, we also believe that it is not as relevant in this study as in other applications. In particular, the common legal and institutional framework and the shared rules set at the central level significantly mitigate the problem of heterogeneity among regions potentially associated with institutional factors. Secondly, at this stage we are interested in isolating unexplained (by demand factors) differentials whatever the source might be (time invariant heterogeneity or 'technical' inefficiency). In the second step of 31 See Greene (2004), (2005) and (2008).
the analysis we will try to see whether the waste levels are correlated with indicators aimed at capturing the quality of the public administration or other exogenous regional characteristics.
First step: a disaggregated analysis by spending category and the relation to quality
Before moving to the second step we estimate regional fixed effects using (5) (according to the specification adopted for Model 1a) also breaking down the dependent variable into its main subcategories. We consider two types of breakdown: (i) the first by economic category (in which we distinguish between wages, purchases of goods and services, spending for private hospitals recognised within the SSN, primary care, pharmaceuticals, and specialised care) 32 and (ii) a second one in which we group together wages, purchases of goods and services and spending to reimburse private hospitals to proxy overall public spending for hospital services.
Given the estimates for each expenditure category we can recover aggregate regional 'waste levels'. Assuming that each expenditure item h presents a relationship as in (5) 33 Figure 4 shows for each region the contribution of each expenditure item to the difference between its own inefficiency score and the minimum one ) (
As to the magnitude of the expenditure categories considered, it should be noted that in 2005 for the Italian average, wages accounted for 33 per cent of total expenditure, the purchase of goods and services for 27 per cent, primary care for 6 per cent, pharmaceuticals for 13 per cent, private hospital care for 9 per cent, and specialised care for 4 per cent. 33 Given (7), regional effects can be obtained by aggregating the results of the estimation of the expenditure items will be negative. This means that a large distortion in a relatively small spending item might be compensated by a relatively smaller distortion in a spending item that accounts for a large fraction of total outlays. 37 This means that for the regions under consideration the inefficiency level for this item, although large, is less pronounced than the inefficiency in other spending categories. Bolzano) the situation is different, with most of the distortion being attributable to hospital spending. The particular geographic characteristics of these regions, both located in the Alps, might play a role. As regards the distortion in the purchases of goods and services, it seems in line with average inefficiency levels in each of the regions. For this item the large impact on overall unexplained spending ( Figure 5 ) seems to reflect mainly its large incidence on total expenditure. It has to be noted, however, that regions with lower health spending seem to have been particularly effective in containing outlays in this category.
An overall glance at the results highlights a clear geographical pattern: 38 Also in light of the identification problem discussed above, before moving on to disentangle some of the characteristics that might be related to the regional fixed effects, it is worth checking whether the differentials isolated in our first step reflect differences in the quality of services provided to the public. To do that we consider two types of indicators: a) the mobility of patients between regions; b) declared patients' satisfaction.
If we look at patients' mobility between regions 39 ( Figure 7 ) as an indirect indicator of the quality of health services (or at least of the degree of quality 'perceived' by patients), we observe that patients consistently tend to move from the South towards the Centre and North of Italy. The correlation between the regional fixed effects and the average attraction index observed over the period considered is highly negative (-0.64) and significant so that the higher the 'perceived' quality, the lower the 'unexplained' spending.
Similarly, indicators that take into account declared patient satisfaction 40 for hospital services display a clear North-South pattern with patients being more satisfied with hospital services in the North. In particular, the correlation between average patient satisfaction indexes for nurses, physicians and sanitary services and the estimated regional effects vary between -0.48 and -0.31.
Finally, the complexity of the treatments is also on average higher in the regions with lower regional effects.
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In brief, the higher spending in the southern regions with respect to the Centre and North does not seem to be ascribable to perceived or reported higher quality. So, what causes the difference? Are there any factors that policy makers could control for in order to cut spending without reducing the amount of services provided? 38 This result is in line with other studies that have addressed the analysis of health spending differentials. See for example Pammolli, Papa and Salerno (2009) . 39 In particular, we consider the attraction index, measured as the ratio between the inflow and outflow of patients into a given region. An index value > 1 means that the inflow of patients from other regions is greater than the outflow to other regions, and hence the region attracts patients from other areas of the country. 40 The satisfaction with hospital services is drawn from surveys included in the Indagine multiscopo regularly performed by Istat. The data considered here refer to the period 1998-2007. 41 The correlation between the average case mix (measured as the standard hospital stay*the normalised applicable DRG) over the observed period and regional fixed effects is -0.89. 
The empirical analysis -second step: the drivers of regional differentials
The second step of our analysis tries to address this issue. In particular, we investigate the correlation between regional effects and some supply factors and regional characteristics which could influence the unexplained variability observed in spending levels.
The analysis exploits the result of the expenditure levels estimation in step one. In particular, we consider the covariates of the regional fixed effects estimating the following linear model: 42 This is consistent with the assumption of regional effects being time invariant. As seen above, the time invariant component estimated using time varying frontier models or fixed effects gives equivalent results. Apart from the common impact due to the decaying factor, estimated waste levels are strongly correlated using the four estimation procedures discussed in Appendix B. 43 The indicators considered under this category are the average over the observed period of the incidence of Caesarian sections and of the incidence of patients discharged by a surgical ward with a medical DRG. 44 In this category we considered the averages of the incidence of SSN employees on residents; composition of employees (ratio of medical staff over total employees); incidences of public hospital beds on residents; incidences Given the small number of observations, we started by considering one (or at most two) regressor for each category: the index for Caesarean sections, the index for total employment and its composition; the indicator for general practitioners with a large number of patients; the ratio between the number of beds in private and public hospitals; the share of the use of generic pharmaceuticals and proxies for social capital ( Table 5 shows the results of the estimation). To check the robustness of the results, we also considered each category at a time and substituted the proxy/ies included in the estimated specification. The appropriateness index turns out to be significantly related to unexplained spending differentials (even when we substitute Caesarean sections with the surgical ward discharge index 48 ). The higher the inappropriateness of treatments the higher the regional effects.
As to supply indicators, a higher number of employees is related to higher spending, as expected.
Instead, the coefficient of the proxy for the composition of the staff is not significant.
The workload of general practitioners is significant; 49 in particular, the share of practitioners with a very large number of patients is related to higher spending (the same happens when considering the average number of patients for general practitioners). The workload of primary care doctors has a strong positive impact on hospital and pharmaceutical spending as well as spending for primary care. This suggests that too many patients to follow might make it more difficult for general practitioners to avoid unnecessary access to hospital services and use of pharmaceuticals.
of private hospital beds; ratio between number of beds in private to public hospitals; share of expenditure for care provided by private hospitals; average stay in public hospitals; average stay in private hospitals; number of general pratictioners; number of patients per general pratictioner; number of general pratictioners with more than 1500 patients. 45 To proxy the quality of administration we consider indicators of some practices that aim to reduce the resources absorbed by pharmaceutical outlays without reducing the quantity provided or the effectiveness of the treatments: the share of pharmaceutical expenditure for generic (off-patent) pharmaceuticals and the share of expenditure for pharmaceuticals delivered directly by the SSN in total pharmaceutical expenditure. We also considered an indicator for the use of IT in other Italian local governments in each region; in particular, we use a municipality IT index, which is given by the share of municipalities whose general registry office has been computerised. 46 In particular, we consider several proxies for social capital commonly used in the literature: incidence of blood donors per 1000 residents; incidence of recyclable waste collection (we thank Marco Casiraghi for providing these indicators); average turnout at referenda; interest in politics and morality. The indicators for solidarity/'morality' and participation/'interest in politics' are drawn from Giordano et al. (2009) . In particular, solidarity/'morality' is a composite index summarising self-reported pro-social attitudes and objective measures of altruistic behaviour (such as blood donation); similarly, interest in politics is built from self-reported answers and more objective measures (such as referendum participation). 47 All the estimated models exclude the constant term. In fact, the mean value of the fixed effects is zero by construction. To check for this, however, we also replicate the estimation including the constant term, which turns out to be not significant. Moreover, neither the sign nor the magnitute of the estimated coefficients are affected by including/excluding the constant. 48 In this case, however, it interferes with the significance of the number of employees indicator. 49 In Italy, general practioners are paid on a capitation basis. Proxies (either the ratio of beds in private to public hospitals or the share of spending for private hospitals in total spending) for the relevance of the private sector display a positive but not significant coefficient in the regression for aggregate regional effects; the coefficient is significant, however, in the estimation of spending categories, in particular hospitals, primary care and pharmaceuticals. The impact of a larger role for the private sector could be relevant, but our aggregate analysis is not able to highlight it. This could be due to the relation that characterises the relevance of the private sector and some of the other control variables.
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As expected, proxies for good practices (we considered alternatively the index for the use of generics or for direct delivery of pharmaceuticals) do display a negative relation to unexplained spending.
Finally, we also included in our model proxies for informal rules and habits that might play a role in the performances of different public administrations. The economic literature often highlights the impact of history and economic institutions on the development of different regions.
Institutions also include informal rules and constraints which are often summarised in the concept of social capital. 51 In this context, social capital captures the level of trust and habits of cooperation shared among members of a local community. As to our results, social capital indicators turn out to be significant when splitting the two aspects of solidarity/'morality' and participation/'interest in politics', the first one being positively related to spending -probably reflecting a higher propensity to share fundamental services -the second one being negatively related to regional effects -suggesting that the more public attention is given to policy makers' activity the stronger their incentive to manage the available resources efficiently.
Although the second step of the empirical analysis is based on a small sample size, the correlations we detect are sufficiently robust to derive some general policy considerations.
Regional spending differentials seem to be related both to persistent (sticky?) regional features (such as social capital) and characteristics which in the medium term can be controlled by policy makers (such as the appropriateness of health treatments, the workload of general practitioners or the use of generics). Spreading administrative best practices and enhancing the degree of appropriateness of treatments would be an effective way of reducing spending differentials and increasing efficiency in the use of public funds. Even relatively limited improvements could turn into substantial savings: given our results, an increase in the appropriateness level or in the use of 50 For example, the correlation between our regressor for inappropriateness (Caesarean sections) and the ratio between the number of beds in private and public hospitals is positive (0.43). Furthermore, a more prominent role of the private sector is also reflected ceteris paribus in a lower number of employees in the public sector. 51 See Putnam (1993) , de Blasio and Nuzzo (2006), Nuzzo (2006) .
generics by 1 percentage point 52 implies on average a reduction of respectively 1.8 and 5.3 per cent in total expenditure (€20.9 and €62.3 per capita).
Concluding remarks
Several studies have documented the presence of regional differentials in public health spending in Italy. The aim of this work is to contribute to this discussion by analysing the determinants of per capita health expenditure focusing on identifying the drivers of inefficiency for the panel of
Italian regions and the existence of potential room for savings. The paper presents an empirical analysis of per capita expenditure levels that takes into account the regional differences in the need for health services. The remaining differences in spending (the "unexplained differentials") are then studied in relation to structural characteristics and policy variables.
First, the results confirm the existence of potential margins for savings which are related at least in part to differences in the effectiveness of public administration. However, with respect to previous studies, our methodology not only allows us to evaluate the overall inefficiency level for every region, but also to estimate the contribution of each spending item (e.g. wages, pharmaceuticals, etc.) to that inefficiency. For all the regions, the analysis further breaks it down into two factors: the first accounts for the budget share of each spending category, the second captures its relative inefficiency. In our framework it is thus possible to single out the categories which need careful monitoring in the regions with poorer performances, such as outlays for pharmaceuticals.
The second step of the study suggests that there are policy tools (e.g. the use of generic drugs or the workload of general practitioners) that might help to keep inefficiency under control.
Moreover, some supply structure indicators and proxies for good practices seem to be particularly important for certain spending categories.
Appendix A: The impact of different hypotheses on the financing mechanisms

A.1 Ex post bail-out
Let us consider a one period economy with N regions. Each region has a given income level (and
is the total income in the economy (and the overall tax base). 52 These computations use the result of the estimation of Model 1a in Table 4 and the coefficents reported in the first column of Table 5 The tax rate set by the CG will then be: . In equilibrium each region will be able to produce the optimal quantity and spending will be financed through transfers from the central budget, with tax revenue collected in rich regions used to finance spending in poor ones as well. All the regions will have as low as possible local taxation. Tax rates at local level would be correlated with neither the degree of efficiency in the production of healthcare nor the magnitude of income differentials.
A.2 Fiscal decentralisation
Assume now that a minimum local tax rate is mandated by law. Healthcare financing will then be split between revenue from a tax set by the CG (t), revenue from the mandatory local tax (µ) and revenue from an optional local tax (ν i ). In this scenario, the CG will set the tax rate so that:
Now suppose that regional governments have different beliefs with regard to the commitment of the CG to limit the transfer to S , i.e. some of the regions believe that the budget constraint is 'soft' (J regions of type j) others that it is 'tight' (Z regions of type z, with J+Z=N).
Regions of type j will set the optional local tax rate at the minimum ( j ν =0), while regions of type Similarly, for the other regions of type z the ranking according to optional local tax rates would not necessarily reflect the ranking in terms of efficiency levels. Demand and income levels also play a role.
Finally, in this set-up regions that overspend with respect to the resources drawn through mandatory local taxes and the flat transfer set by the CG are not necessarily the most inefficient ones. Overspending which is ex post financed by the CG could be a signal of the region's belief in the commitment of the CG to limit its transfers.
The inability of the CG to infer efficiency levels from regional spending and tax levels reflects the impossibility of observing regions' beliefs, imperfect knowledge about the healthcare production function and the ultimate objective of the CG of financing the production of optimal levels of healthcare in all the regions.
Given this framework, which outlines the financing of the healthcare sector over recent decades, we assume that regions are able to finance their preferred level of health services.
Appendix B -Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our estimates, we perform a series of exercises described in Table B 53 Specifically, we consider three indices: GDP deflator, CPI, HICP for health product indices. The combinations considered are described in Table B .1. 54 In particular, the correlation between the estimated regional effects ranges from 0.81 to 1.00. 55 A drawback of this approach, however, is that using stochastic frontiers requires explicit assumptions in terms of the distributions involved. Initially, we assume that the stochastic frontier is invariant over time (Table B. 2 -column B). 57 We then consider a time varying version à la Battese and Coelli (1992) (Table B. 2 -column C).
We also estimate a fixed effect model with time varying regional effects. In particular, we derive an estimating equation equivalent to the time varying stochastic frontier described above (cf. (5) and rearrangenging the time invariant fixed effects, the estimation of α i -min(α i ) is analogous to the estimation of u i . 58 See Greene (2008) for a discussion of the available approaches to the analysis of economic efficiency. 59 In terms of rearranging model (5) 60 This specification is analagous to those discussed in Cornwell et al. (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990) , where the authors suggest substituting a constant inefficiency parameter with a quadratic specification as in (B.8). x From the estimates of (B.8) we can recover the parameters we are interested in: the regional (time invariant) effects α i and the decay factor η (Table B. 2 -column D). In both time varying models (C and D) the estimated decay factor is negative and significant. This might reflect a common increasing pattern in health expenditure which could be due to the impact of technological developments in the production of healthcare, in the organisation at national level of the health system or in the structure of preferences. Real total expenditure (corrected to take into account patient mobility)
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